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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE WORKPLACE: HOW I LEARNED TO 




Social media has permeated every aspect of society. The use of 
social media can easily lead to issues in an employment law context 
when employees suffer adverse employment actions based on the 
information they choose to share via their personal social media 
websites. Today’s laws concerning online privacy are in a nebulous 
state and have led some observers to suggest that employees who use 
social media may not find adequate legal protection from wrongful 
termination. This Note refutes this contention by analyzing current laws 
that may protect employees from adverse employment actions due to 
their use of social media. This Note also addresses the recent 
memoranda released by the National Labor Relations Board regarding 
employee social media use in an attempt to distill some concrete 
categories of protected employee conduct. Finally, this Note addresses 
and dismisses suggested alternatives to the current laws, including 
drafting new legislation, broadening the impact of lifestyle 
discrimination statutes, and broadening the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment through the elimination of the Third Party Doctrine.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One in every nine people on Earth has a Facebook account.1 Twitter 
averages 190 million tweets per day.2 It took Google+ merely sixteen 
days to amass ten million users.3 As social media use continues to rise, 
it is no wonder that social media issues continue to create complex and 
dynamic issues for employers and employees. What happens when an 
employer decides to make a hiring decision based on viewing a 
potential employee’s social media website or page? What happens if a 
current employee makes an unflattering statement about a supervisor or 
a coworker? What if an employer simply disapproves of an employee’s 
status update? In an age where information is available with just a click 
of a button, employees worry what employers may discover about them. 
Conversely, employers are left to worry about potential exposure to 
liability. 
Employers face a variety of issues regarding employee social media 
use and thus have a strong interest in avoiding possible conflicts and 
liability. Since information posted on the Internet survives indefinitely,4 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Jeff Bullas, 20 Stunning Social Media Statistics Plus Infograph, JEFFBULLAS’S BLOG 
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.jeffbullas.com/2011/09/02/20-stunning-social-media-statistics. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. For a discussion on the duration and effects of posting information on the Internet, see 
generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2009). 
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employers have a strong incentive to ensure that posts made by 
employees are in compliance with state and federal regulations. While 
courts acknowledge that employers have no duty to monitor employees’ 
private communications, courts have extended the employers’ liability 
areas to the physical workplace and to “settings that are related to the 
workplace.”5 An employer can be held liable for harassment if a court 
determines that the employer had reason to know that such activity was 
taking place.6 Social media that facilitates conversations of employees 
is an extension of the workplace where “relations among employees are 
cemented or sometimes sundered.”7 
Employers can be held vicariously liable for defamatory statements 
if such statements were made by an agent of the employer in the 
discharge of the agent’s duty to its employer.8 Employers must also be 
aware that some professional social media sites, such as LinkedIn, may 
expose employers to liability when coworkers or other professionals 
comment on an employee’s skills or expertise.9 These types of 
“recommendations” may seem innocuous at first blush; however, 
whether they are positive or negative, recommendations may leave an 
employer susceptible to liability in cases of defamation or wrongful 
termination.10 
Social media is an easy way for confidential client information to be 
accidentally or deliberately exposed. This exposure could lead an 
employer to violate any number of state or federal regulations aimed at 
protecting personal information.11 The Federal Trade Commission can 
hold a company liable for an employee’s social media statements that 
include testimonials or endorsements about a company’s products or 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Espinoza v. Cnty. of Orange, G043067, 2012 WL 420149, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 
2012) (holding that an employer is liable for a coworker’s harassment based on a disability 
when the harassing blog posts were made on a workplace computer and the plaintiff was 
specifically named). 
 6. See Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 552 (N.J. 2000) (asserting that 
employers are responsible for curbing harassment stemming from a company’s online social 
bulletin board). 
 7. Id. at 550. 
 8. See Mars, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 71 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that a 
corporation may be held liable for defamation by its agent if such defamation is “referable to the 
duty owing by the agent to the corporation and was made in the discharge of that duty”). 
 9. See ADVISEN LTD., SOCIAL MEDIA: EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THEIR EMPLOYEES 6 (Sept. 2011), available at http://corner.advisen.com/pdf_files/socialmedia_e  
mployerresponsibility.pdf. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 6–7. Disclosure of confidential information could potentially put an employer 
“in violation of certain federal and state regulations such as HIPAA (the Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act), the Sarbanes–Oxley Act or the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act to name a few.” Id. at 7. 
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services where the employee fails to disclose his or her relationship with 
the company.12 
Commentators have argued for a change in existing laws or creation 
of new laws to protect employees’ social media privacy rights.13 These 
alterations to current jurisprudence are unnecessary. Privacy settings are 
an employee’s best protection against unwanted employer visits to the 
employee’s personal social media webpage. While limiting access to a 
social media profile or site may be “fundamentally crippling the social 
attributes that have made [social media websites] so popular . . . to their 
hundreds of millions of users,”14 it is imperative for individuals to 
protect themselves by setting privacy controls. Many potential 
protections are triggered when employees make their social media 
websites private rather than publically available. Once current and 
potential employees enable their privacy settings, they are protected by 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA),15 which bars employers from 
accessing an individual’s private social media website. There are 
several tort actions, such as intrusion upon seclusion or invasion of 
privacy, that an employee may utilize against an employer. 
Additionally, employers are prohibited from accessing an individual’s 
social media website and using any information protected by Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)16 to decline to hire applicants 
or terminate current employees. Employees must be cautious about 
what they choose to share publically via social media; however, they 
can find protection from unlawful hiring decisions and adverse 
employment actions in the SCA, Title VII, and the First Amendment.17  
Employees who fear termination for their social media activities 
under the guise of “at-will employment” may also find protection in the 
recent decisions and policy memos of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB).18 The NLRB has cracked down on employers’ social 
media usage policies, finding that many of them violate the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).19 As a result, many employees terminated 
because of alleged policy violations are reinstated or compensated for 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Id.  
 13. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 14. Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and 
Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 1009 (2011). 
 15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle 
Kentov, Regional Dir. of Region 12, Miami Jewish Health Sys., No. 12-CA-65993, 2011 WL 
6960023, *2 (Dec. 14, 2011) (showing that a terminated employee was able to raise an issue to 
the NLRB regarding an adverse employment action based on the time proximity of the action in 
comparison to the employee’s derogatory Facebook message about a supervisor). 
 19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
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their termination. This Note argues that employees currently have ample 
protection from employers leveraging social media use against them in 
adverse employment actions, provided that the employees are enabling 
their social media privacy settings. As long as employees diligently 
attempt to protect their online privacy, further legislation or the adaption 
of other legal protections is not necessary to protect employees. 
First, this Note details existing protections that employees have, 
including Title VII, the First Amendment, the SCA, and the NLRA. The 
importance of implementing privacy settings is highlighted throughout. 
Second, this Note explores recently released NLRB decisions, policy 
memoranda, and directives regarding social media and employment 
law. Finally, this Note argues that additional legislation or adaptation of 
current laws regarding social media is neither useful nor necessary. In 
order to reap the benefit of the ample protection available, employees 
must efficiently use privacy settings.  
I.  SURVEY OF PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYEE SOCIAL MEDIA USE 
There are numerous channels available to protect employees from 
adverse employment actions based on their lawful social media use. The 
following Part details the protections afforded to public and private 
employees. Most importantly, this Part discusses the laws that are 
triggered when employees engage privacy settings on their personal 
social media platforms. 
A.  Protection Against Discriminatory Hiring 
Due to the potential liability that employers may encounter with 
employees’ use of personal social media websites, some employers take 
it upon themselves to manage social media risks in hiring policies. 
Despite the fact that employers face certain liabilities in performing 
social media background searches on employees,20 a staggering number 
of employers still conduct such searches on potential employees. A 
2011 survey conducted by Reppler indicated that 91% of surveyed 
employers used social networking websites to screen prospective 
employees.21 Nearly half of the employers surveyed indicated that they 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See Gerry Richardson, Social Media Recruiting Exposes Employers to Liability Risks, 
BLOG FOR BUS. L. (Aug. 6, 2012), http://theblogforbusinesslaw.com/social-media-recruiting-
exposes-employers-to-liability-risks (acknowledging that the EEOC forbids employers from 
using social media to seek out potential employees’ personal information such as age, disability, 
ethnicity, gender, medical history, and religion). 
 21. Managing Your Online Image Across Social Networks, REPPLER EFFECT (Sept. 27, 
2011, 5:00 AM), http://blog.reppler.com/2011/09/27/managing-your-online-image-across-social-
network. Reppler is a social media monitoring service designed to help users of various social 
media websites by limiting potential risks and showing users how they are perceived through 
their websites. This study was conducted by surveying 300 individuals involved with their 
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performed these searches after receiving a prospective employee’s 
application but before initiating a conversation with the applicant.22 
After conducting a search, 69% of the employers responded that they 
declined to hire an applicant based on information discovered through 
the applicant’s social media website.23 While these background searches 
have become quite common and may expose a great deal of information 
about prospective employees, an employer’s hiring decision or adverse 
employment action must still be lawful.  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces 
laws that prohibit discriminatory hiring.24 Title VII prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national 
origin, or religion.25 Gaskell v. University of Kentucky26 exemplifies 
how social media can potentially facilitate discriminatory hiring 
practices in violation of Title VII.27 In 2007 the University of Kentucky 
established a hiring committee to name a founding director for the 
university’s astronomical observatory.28 Martin Gaskell was the leading 
candidate for the position until the committee conducted an online 
search of Gaskell, which revealed his personal website.29 Gaskell posted 
an article on his personal website entitled Modern Astronomy, the Bible, 
and Creation.30  
Though the committee had previously noted that Gaskell was 
“clearly the most experienced” candidate and had “already done 
everything [the hiring committee] could possibly want the observatory 
director to do,” the committee recommended another candidate for the 
position.31 The hiring committee considered the “scientific integrity” of 
Gaskell’s statements and consulted with university biologists who in 
turn expressed concern about Gaskell’s “creationist views.”32 One of the 
                                                                                                                     
respective companies’ hiring processes. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. It is worth noting that 68% of the employers surveyed also said that they hired an 
applicant based off information discovered on the applicant’s social media website. Id. 
 24. Certain laws are only covered by the EEOC if employers have a set number of 
employees. For a detailed explanation of these exceptions, see Coverage, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/coverage.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 
2014). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012). 
 26. Gaskell v. Univ. of Ky., No. 09-244-KSF, 2010 WL 4867630, at *4 (E.D.K.Y. Nov. 
23, 2010). 
 27. This case was never fully litigated as the parties reached a settlement in 2011. See Jay 
Blanton, Gaskell Case Resolved: Statement from UK Counsel, UKNOW: UNIV. OF KY. NEWS 
(Jan. 18, 2011), http://uknow.uky.edu/content/gaskell-case-resolved-statement-uk-counsel. 
 28. Gaskell, 2010 WL 4867630, at *1–2. 
 29. Id. at *3–4. 
 30. Id. at *4. 
 31. Id. at *3, *5–6. 
 32. Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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committee members sent an email to the rest of the committee 
complaining that Gaskell was being denied the job based on his 
religious views and that “‘no objective observer could possibly believe’ 
the decision was based on any reason other than religion.”33 Another 
committee member replied that he believed religion was a part of at 
least two of the committee members’ decisions and that he worried 
about the image Gaskell would present to the public.34  
Since Title VII protections have been applied to employment 
decisions made based on an applicant’s social media sites, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that other EEOC-protected classes will be 
afforded the same protection. For example, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employment discrimination on the 
basis of an individual’s disability,35 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) forbids employment discrimination against 
individuals who are over the age of forty.36  
B.  Public Employees’ First Amendment Protection 
The First Amendment provides freedom of speech protection to 
public employees. There is a two-prong test known as the Pickering–
Connick test that determines if the First Amendment will protect a 
public employee’s speech.37 Employees must show their speech 
addresses a matter of public concern and their free speech interest 
outweighs their public employer’s efficiency interest.38 The Supreme 
Court has defined a matter of public concern as “any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community.”39 “Whether an employee’s 
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the 
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the 
whole record.”40 The second prong of the test requires a balance of 
employer and employee interests. The Supreme Court further 
streamlined the First Amendment test by holding that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”41 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12112 (2012). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (2012). 
 37. The test employs standards from Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), as well as 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 38. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. 
 39. Id. at 146. 
 40. Id. at 147–48. 
 41. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
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The Pickering–Connick test has granted First Amendment protection 
to public employees using social media.42 Even the simple action of a 
user “liking” a page on Facebook rises to the level of protected 
speech.43 Though the district court in Bland v. Roberts held that a public 
employee’s “like” of an opponent’s campaign Facebook page was not 
substantial enough to warrant constitutional protection as speech or 
political affiliation,44 the Fourth Circuit recently reversed that 
decision.45 After reviewing “what it means to ‘like’ a Facebook page,” 
the court found that the conduct qualified as speech and equated the 
“like” in this case to “the Internet equivalent of displaying a political 
sign in one’s front yard.”46 
The Pickering–Connick test provides public employees more 
protection than private employees due to the fact that only public 
employees are afforded First Amendment protection of their private 
speech. The Court “nevertheless recognizes that government employers 
have as much of a right as private employers to control, manage, and 
discipline their employees when their speech or actions adversely 
interfere with their job responsibilities.”47 In other words, if a public 
employer finds an employee’s social media use to be disruptive to the 
work environment, that employee can be terminated just as easily if the 
employee were privately employed.48 
C.  Private Employees’ National Labor Relations Act Protection 
The NLRA applies only to private sector employees.49 Section 7 of 
the NLRA protects employee participation in concerted activities.50 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, at *4 (E.D. 
Ark. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding that a Facebook post criticizing an official working in his official 
capacity is a matter of public concern and is thus speech protected by the First Amendment). 
 43. See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013).  
 44. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
 45. Bland, 730 F.3d at 386.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Catherine Crane, Note, Social Networking v. The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A 
Potential Defense for Employees Fired for Facebooking, Terminated for Twittering, Booted for 
Blogging, and Sacked for Social Networking, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 639, 644 (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84–85 (2004) (recognizing that a 
police officer’s off-duty conduct was not protected speech where it exploited his employer’s 
image and brought the professionalism of his coworkers into disrepute); Marshall v. Mayor of 
Savannah, 366 F. App’x 91, 97 (11th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that a female firefighter’s sexually 
suggestive MySpace photographs taken at the fire station are not speech protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 49. See Frequently Asked Questions, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/faq/nlrb (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). 
 50. “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
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While the NLRA does not define the term “concerted activity,”51 the 
NLRB defines it as “two or more employees tak[ing] action for their 
mutual aid or protection regarding terms and conditions of 
employment.”52 A single employee may also participate in a concerted 
activity if that employee is “acting on the authority of other employees, 
bringing group complaints to the employer’s attention, trying to induce 
group action, or seeking to prepare for group action.”53 Section 7 
protections apply to both union and nonunion employees.54 A recent 
analysis of charges to the NLRB by employees claiming to have been 
disciplined or fired because of online communications involving the 
workplace found that “most employees are not engaging online in 
concerted activities protected by the [NLRA].55 Rather . . . they are 
griping about work and getting fired for it.”56 Even though “concerted 
activity does not include mere complaints from one employee to 
another . . . such griping can nonetheless amount to concerted activity 
when the matter is of common interest to all employees and implicitly 
solicits support or attempts to incite collective action.”57  
In 2007 Joan Wells, a registered nurse, wrote and posted a story 
regarding patient care on a union maintained website.58 Wells alleged 
that the hospital was understaffed and that “the for-profit company that 
owns [the] [h]ospital, makes more than enough money to pay for 
additional staff.”59 Further, Wells stated that the ratio of patients to 
nurses was too high and a patient could have a heart attack and possibly 
die because a nurse may not be able to respond fast enough.60 Wells was 
fired for the website story as well as comments made to a local 
newspaper.61 In applying NLRA concerted activity protections to the 
case, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the statements 
made on the website were clearly related to the union’s ongoing labor 
dispute over staffing.62 As such, Wells’ termination was considered 
                                                                                                                     
or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 51. Sprague, supra note 14, at 959. 
 52. Employee Rights, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: 
Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 278 (2002). 
 55. Sprague, supra note 14, at 957. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the 
Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 940 (2007). 
 58. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1250 (2007), enforced sub nom. 
Nev. Serv. Emps. Union, Local 1107, SEIU v. NLRB, 358 F. App’x 783 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 59. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1250–51. 
 60. Id. at 1250. 
 61. Id. at 1251. 
 62. Id. at 1253. 
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unlawful and the hospital was ordered to reinstate Wells to her former 
job and compensate her for loss of earnings and benefits.63 
Prior to Wells’ charge, the NLRB rarely addressed employee 
termination due to online activity.64 The NLRB did not file another 
charge of unfair labor practice regarding a social media related 
termination until 2009. Dawnmarie Souza, a veteran paramedic, 
received a complaint against her that was filed by a patient’s spouse.65 
Souza’s supervisor requested that Souza write a statement about the 
incident.66 Souza’s supervisor denied her request to have a union 
representative present while she wrote her statement.67 Souza later 
expressed dissatisfaction with the incident via her Facebook page by 
referring to her supervisor using derogatory expressions and a term 
known to Souza’s coworkers to mean “psychiatric patient.”68 She was 
initially suspended, and then ultimately fired for the comments made 
about her supervisor on her Facebook page.69 The General Counsel of 
the NLRB found that the employer was in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA70 by refusing Souza the opportunity to have a union 
representative present.71 The General Counsel decided that Souza’s 
remarks on her Facebook page regarding her supervisor were not so 
“opprobrious” as to deny her NLRA protection.72 Souza’s case was 
settled out of court and does not provide a legal precedent.73 Between 
June 2009 and April 2011, the NLRB received roughly one hundred 
charges that employees suffered adverse employment actions due to 
exercising their right to a concerted activity via social media.74 The 
NLRB responded with two decisions and a series of explanatory 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 1261–62. 
 64. Sprague, supra note 14, at 960–61. 
 65. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB Office of 
the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir. of Region 34, Am. Med. Response of 
Conn., Inc., No. 34-CA-12576, at 2–4 (Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter AMR Memo], available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4. 
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 4–5. 
 70. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
 71. AMR Memo, supra note 65, at 1. 
 72. In reaching this conclusion, the General Counsel considered the four factors used to 
determine if an employee’s conduct is so egregious that it no longer warrants NLRB protection. 
Id. at 9. Those factors include, “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the 
discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any 
way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.” Id. (citing Atl. Steel Co. & Kenneth 
Chastain, 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)). 
 73. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Firing Test Case Settled out of Court, CNNMONEY (Feb. 
8, 2011, 1:44 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/08/technology/facebook_firing_settlement/in 
dex.htm. 
 74. See Sprague, supra note 14, at 962. 
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memoranda. Part II of this Note closely examines the employees’ 
charges and the NLRB’s response. 
D.  Potential Protections of the Stored Communications Act 
The Stored Communications Act of 1986 makes it unlawful to 
“(1) intentionally access[] without authorization a facility through 
which an electronic communication service is provided; or 
(2) intentionally exceed[] an authorization to access that facility; and 
thereby obtain[], alter[], or prevent[] authorized access to a wire or 
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.”75 Several 
recent court decisions make it clear that the SCA may be a viable cause 
of action for employees who believe that their employers have 
unlawfully accessed their private websites.76  
In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, an airline pilot sued his employer for 
accessing without authorization his private personal website, which 
criticized his employer, coworkers, and airline union.77 Konop 
controlled the viewers of his website by requiring preapproved visitors 
to log in with a user name and password.78 Hawaiian Airlines’ vice 
president requested and received permission from two employees whose 
names appeared on Konop’s approved list to access the website under 
that name.79 At least one of the employees had not previously visited 
Konop’s website.80 Konop’s website records indicated that one of the 
names was used fourteen times to log on to the website and the other 
name was used over twenty times.81  
Konop filed suit against Hawaiian Airlines alleging a violation of the 
SCA, among other claims.82 The district court granted summary 
judgment against Konop, finding that Hawaiian Airlines was exempted 
from SCA liability because the vice president received the consent of 
authorized users before accessing the plaintiff’s website.83 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed, finding that neither of the employees whose names 
were used could be considered “users” of the website, since one 
employee had not previously accessed the website and it was unclear if 
the other had previously accessed the website.84 The Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                     
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012). 
 76. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002); Crispin v. 
Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. 
Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 77. Konop, 302 F.3d at 872. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 872–73. 
 80. Id. at 873. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 873. 
 83. Id. at 879. 
 84. Id. at 880. 
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holding indicates that the SCA applies to employees’ private websites 
that have appropriate privacy protections. However, it may exempt 
employers who gain access to an employee’s personal website using 
credentials supplied to other employees if employers are given 
permission by those authorized employees.  
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. is a copyright infringement case 
that suggests that social media websites can trigger SCA protection.85 
The defendants in Crispin attempted to subpoena the plaintiff’s 
Facebook and MySpace pages, including private messages and wall 
comments, for information regarding the underlying lawsuit.86 The 
plaintiffs argued that the SCA protected this information from 
disclosure.87 The defendants argued that the SCA did not foreclose their 
access since they were seeking information that was not private, as it 
was readily available to anyone with access to the plaintiff’s social 
media profile pages.88 The Central District of California held that the 
private messages were “inherently private” and protected by the SCA; 
however, the court remanded the issue of the wall posts back to the 
magistrate judge for “a fuller evidentiary record regarding . . . privacy 
settings and the extent of access allowed to [plaintiff’s] Facebook wall 
and MySpace comments.”89 The court suggested that the SCA would 
protect the wall posts and comments if the plaintiff had shielded them 
from the general public by using privacy settings.90 The court compared 
the wall posts and comments to “private electronic bulletin board 
services,” which has previously been protected under the SCA.91 The 
court also noted that the number of individuals with access to the wall 
posts or comments was irrelevant in determining if the plaintiff intended 
the information to be private so long as the plaintiff purposely engaged 
the social media site’s privacy settings.92 
In Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, the court held that an 
employer’s unauthorized access to an employee’s private social media 
website was a violation of the SCA.93 In Pietrylo, several employees of 
a restaurant created an employees-only MySpace group page to vent 
about their employment frustrations.94 The website contained sexual 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 86. Id. at 968–69, 76–77. 
 87. Id. at 969. 
 88. Id. at 976–77. 
 89. Id. at 991. 
 90. Crane, supra note 47, at 669 (citing Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991). 
 91. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 980–81. 
 92. Id. at 990. 
 93. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp. (Pietrylo II), No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, 
at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 94. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 WL 6085437, at *1 (D.N.J. 
July 25, 2008). 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 10
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/10
2014] SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE WORKPLACE 491 
 
remarks about the employees and customers as well as references to 
violence and illegal drug use.95 The restaurant’s management 
circumvented the employees’ privacy settings by coercing another 
employee to give them access to the website.96 The New Jersey District 
Court reasoned that the login authorization was not freely given to 
management and therefore management violated the SCA by 
“knowingly, intentionally, or purposefully” accessing the website 
without authorization.97 
The significance of a user’s privacy settings cannot be stressed 
enough. In order to trigger protection from the SCA, these cases 
illustrate the importance of individuals’ attempts to set privacy controls 
on their social media sites. Failure to do so may allow employers to 
avoid SCA liability by arguing that the employee’s social media was 
“readily accessible” to the public.98 Unfortunately, a high percentage of 
social media users allow their information to remain public. A 2012 
Pew Internet study indicated that only 58% of social media users 
utilized privacy settings.99 The study also showed that nearly half of all 
social media users encountered some difficulty when managing social 
media privacy settings.100  
The law in this area is far from settled.101 While courts have not 
affirmatively extended the SCA to Facebook or MySpace posts, courts 
have left the door open for the SCA to potentially provide a cause of 
action for plaintiffs whose social media websites are accessed by 
individuals, be it employers or otherwise, without authorization so long 
as appropriate privacy settings are used.102 Some commentators argue 
that this is an unnecessarily broad extension of the SCA and that judges 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Id. at *2. 
 96. See id. at *1. 
 97. Pietrylo II, 2009 WL 3128420, at *2–3. 
 98. “It shall not be unlawful . . . for any person to intercept or access an electronic 
communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that 
such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g) (2012). 
 99. Mary Madden, Privacy Management on Social Media Sites, PEW INTERNET (Feb. 24, 
2012), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Privacy-management-on-social-media/Summary-of-
findings.aspx. 
 100. Id. 
 101. For example, the ramifications of a supervisor viewing an individual’s post meant 
only for friends by being “mutual friends” with that individual have yet to be discussed. See 
Sprague, supra note 14, at 1008–09. Professor Sprague briefly argues that “friend-of-a-friend 
status” might imply that an employer is monitoring an employee’s online activity. Id. at 1009. 
But see Sumien v. Careflite, No. 02-12-00039-CV, 2012 WL 2579525, at *3 (Tex. App. July 5, 
2012) (holding that an employee can be terminated for information posted on a friend’s 
Facebook wall). 
 102. Crane, supra note 47, at 671. 
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will “twist[] the statute to do things that it was never intended to do.”103 
However, next to the NLRA, the SCA, despite “freezing into the law the 
understandings of computer network use as of 1986,”104 can provide 
protection against wrongful adverse employment actions for employees 
who use social media.  
E.  Protection of Employee Privacy 
1.  Social Networking Online Protection Act 
Federal lawmakers are aware that employees have concerns about 
their social media privacy and have taken steps to protect that 
privacy.105 On April 27, 2012, House Bill 5050, known as the Social 
Networking Online Protection Act (SNOPA), was introduced to the 
House of Representatives.106 If passed, SNOPA would prohibit 
employers from asking their employees for their social media passwords 
and protect employees from adverse employment actions as a result of 
refusing to supply such passwords.107 Employees would have equitable 
remedies available to them if employers violated the Act.108 The 
representatives who introduced SNOPA argue “[i]t is erroneous to just 
say that if you don’t want your information accessed that you shouldn’t 
put it online” and “a legal framework should be in place to offer basic 
protections and rights” to individuals who use social media websites.109 
At least eleven states have already passed or proposed legislation that 
prohibits employers from requiring that their employees provide 
passwords or access to their personal social media websites.110 
Regardless of whether SNOPA becomes federal law, employers who 
coerce employees into divulging access to their private social media 
websites may be liable under the SCA because an employee’s coerced 
authorization is not valid authorization for the purpose of avoiding SCA 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, User’s 
Guide]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Eliot Engel, Jan Schakowsky & Michael Grimm, SNOPA Addresses Online 
Privacy Concerns, THE HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (May 15, 2012, 1:46 PM), [hereinafter Engel et 
al., Privacy Concerns], http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/227509-snopa-
addresses-online-privacy-concerns. 
 106. Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013) (reintroduced 
in the 113th Congress after failing to pass during the 112th Congress). 
 107. Id. § 2(a). 
 108. Id. § 2(b)(2). 
 109. Engel et al., Privacy Concerns, supra note 105. 
 110. See J. Mark Poerio & Laura E. Bain, Social Media in the Workplace: Employer 
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liability.111 
2.  Invasion of Privacy Tort Action 
Invasion of privacy torts illustrate another potential avenue of 
existing law that employees can use to protect themselves from adverse 
employment actions based on their social media use.112 An invasion of 
privacy tort can consist of four different legal theories.113 The two 
theories currently relevant to employee social media cases are intrusion 
upon seclusion and publication of private facts.114  
Several plaintiffs were recently unsuccessful in their attempt to bring 
intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy causes of action. In 
those cases, the plaintiffs could not adequately establish an expectation 
of privacy in information they publicly shared; thus, no invasion of 
privacy occurred when the defendants accessed information on their 
social media sites.115 There cannot be an invasion of privacy of 
something that is “available to any person with a computer and thus 
opened [] to the public eye.”116  
In 2012, the Texas Court of Appeals heard an attempt to apply the 
tort of intrusion upon seclusion to protect an employee terminated for 
her use of social media.117 In Sumien v. Careflite, an emergency medical 
technician made a post to a coworker’s Facebook wall concerning 
employee safety, suggesting physical violence towards patients.118 The 
sister of a mutual coworker reported the Facebook post to a supervisor 
and both Sumien and his ambulance partner were terminated.119 The 
court found that Sumien did not have a valid intrusion claim because 
that cause of action requires proof of an intentional intrusion into a 
plaintiff’s private affairs.120 In this particular instance, Sumien did not 
                                                                                                                     
 111. See Crane, supra note 47, at 667 n.185 (citing Pietrylo II, No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 
WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009)). 
 112. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Starbucks Coffee Corp., Nos. CV 08-3354 CRB, CV 09-0047, 
2009 WL 4730899, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2009), aff’d, 418 F. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Sumien v. Careflite, No. 02-12-00039-CV, 2012 WL 2579525, at *1–2 (Tx. Ct. App. July 5, 
2012); Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 861–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 113. The four theories underlying invasion of privacy torts are: (1) intrusion upon 
seclusion, (2) publication of private facts, (3) false light, and (4) appropriation of name or 
likeness. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 114. See, e.g., Sumien, 2012 WL 2579525, at *1–2; Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862. 
 115. See cases cited supra note 112. 
 116. Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862. 
 117. See Sumien, 2012 WL 2579525, at *2–3. 
 118. Id. at *1. Sumien’s ambulance partner posted that she wanted to slap a recent patient 
and suggested the use of restraints out of fear for their safety. Sumien responded to the 
Facebook comment by posting “[y]eah like a boot to the head. . . . Seriously yeah restraints or 
actual HELP from PD instead of the norm.” Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *3. 
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attempt to use privacy settings and “did not realize” that his partner’s 
Facebook friends could see his comments on her wall.121 The court 
found that Sumien’s misunderstanding of Facebook’s privacy settings 
did not establish that Careflite intruded on his seclusion when another 
employee saw and reported his posting.122 Thus, the use of the defense 
was not eliminated for other social media cases where privacy settings 
are in place.  
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals found that an invasion of 
privacy action was not available if the information in question was 
publicly available.123 In Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., a college 
student sued her former high school principal for invasion of privacy 
because the principal submitted the student’s MySpace post containing 
critical comments about her hometown to a local newspaper.124 The 
court ruled that information made public on a MySpace page is not 
private and cannot form the basis of an invasion of privacy claim.125  
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a California 
district court’s grant of summary judgment against an employee 
claiming unlawful termination based on her religious views expressed 
on her MySpace page.126 The court granted summary judgment for the 
employer because there was no evidence that the employee was 
terminated for her religious views; rather, her MySpace page contained 
rants about Starbucks and her coworkers that made other employees feel 
“unsafe.”127 While this case did not turn on the use of privacy settings, it 
is important to note that the employee’s MySpace page was not only 
available to the general public, but she also shared it with her Starbucks 
coworkers.128 
Courts have held against plaintiffs in these cases not because they’ve 
declined to find a right to privacy in social media. Instead, they have 
found that, similar to the SCA,129 intrusion upon seclusion and invasion 
of privacy causes of action require individuals to use some measure of 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 124. Id. at 860–61. 
 125. Id. at 862. The court went so far as to say that “no reasonable person would have had 
an expectation of privacy” in the material Moreno posted on the MySpace page. Id. 
 126. Nguyen v. Starbucks Coffee Corp., Nos. CV 08-3354 CRB, CV 09-0047, 2009 WL 
4730899, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2009), aff’d, 418 F. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 127. Nguyen’s MySpace post included threats against Starbucks and her coworkers. Id. at 
*2. For example: “I’ve worked Tirelessly 2 not cause trouble, BUT I will now have 2 to turn 2 
my revenge side . . . . I thank GOD 4 pot 2 calm down my frustrations n worries or else I will go 
beserk n shoot everyone.” Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See discussion supra Section I.D. 
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privacy controls on their social media websites.130 The decisions in 
these cases all center on the fact that plaintiffs do not have a claim to 
privacy when they make their social media websites publicly available.  
II.  THE NLRB PROVIDES AMPLE PROTECTION TO PRIVATE 
EMPLOYEES 
The NLRB protects private employees who attempt to “take action 
for their mutual aid or protection regarding terms and conditions of 
employment,” “bring[] group complaints to the employer’s attention,” 
or “try[] to induce group action.”131 Recognizing the challenges that 
social media poses in the workplace, the office of the NLRB General 
Counsel released two memoranda on the emerging issue of concerted 
activity in the social media context with a goal of “provid[ing] guidance 
as this area of the law develops.”132 An exploration of these memoranda 
sheds some light on what activity the NLRB is willing to protect. The 
NLRB is also conscious of employers who attempt to protect 
themselves from employees’ social media use. As such, the NLRB 
released memoranda limiting employers’ social media policies in an 
attempt to balance employer interests with employee interests in social 
media.  
A.  A Closer Look at “Concerted Activities” 
The first step for an employee looking for redress from unlawful 
termination or adverse employment action in violation of the NLRA is 
to file a charge against the employer with an NLRB regional office.133 
After an investigation, the NLRB General Counsel will decide whether 
they will file a formal complaint.134 An ALJ hears the complaint and 
then issues a decision in the case.135 An ALJ decision can be appealed 
                                                                                                                     
 130. See cases cited supra note 112. 
 131. See Employee Rights, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 132. Memorandum from E. Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Reg’l 
Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Report of the Acting General Counsel 
Concerning Social Media Cases 2 (Jan. 24, 2012) [hereinafter January NLRB Memo], available 
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567; Memorandum from Lafe E. 
Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident 
Officers, Report of the Acting General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases 2 (May 30, 
2012) [hereinafter May NLRB Memo], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 
09031d4580a375cd. 
 133. Frequently Asked Questions, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/faq/nlrb (last visited Mar. 
3, 2014). 
 134. Investigate Charges, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 135. Id.  
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to the NLRB, which will issue its own decision on the matter.136 An 
NLRB decision can be appealed to a federal court.137 
The NLRB protects employees engaged in protected concerted 
activity from being unlawfully terminated or disciplined.138 Employees’ 
use of social media websites to discuss work issues requires a basic 
analysis of what is a protected concerted activity.139 While the “advent 
of employee social media posting has not created any new bright-line 
test for what constitutes protected concerted activity,”140 the NLRB 
General Counsel gives guidance in how concerted activities apply to 
today’s social media through General Counsel memoranda and ALJ 
decisions on employee charges regarding unlawful termination for 
activity on a social media website.141 Recognizing the challenges that 
social media poses in the workplace, the office of the NLRB General 
Counsel released two memoranda on the emerging issue of concerted 
activity in the social media context, with a goal of “provid[ing] 
guidance as this area of the law develops.”142 Professor Robert Sprague 
has distilled the following elements required to protect a concerted 
activity: “(1) online postings must relate to terms and conditions of 
employment; (2) there must be evidence of concert . . .; (3) there must 
be evidence the employee was seeking to induce or prepare for group 
action; and (4) the posts must reflect an outgrowth of employees’ 
collective concerns.”143 
An exploration of the case law shows that courts’ reasoning is more 
nuanced than limited to these four basic categories. The decisions fall 
short of providing employees with a bright-line test, but by comparing 
the rules from these decisions it is possible to add clarity to this 
previously underdefined and murky area of law. What are “terms and 
conditions of employment?” What does the NLRB believe provides 
“evidence of concert?” Do employees have the right to criticize their 
coworkers via social media? What qualifies as “opprobrious” conduct? 
The answers to these questions will begin to demystify NLRB social 
media protection so that both employees and employers gain a better 
understanding of what will and will not be protected. 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Megan J. Erickson, Employers, Social Media, & Law: Recent NLRB Activity, SOC. 
NETWORKING L. BLOG (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.socialnetworkinglawblog.com/2012/12/empl  
oyers-social-media-law-recent-nlrb.html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See What We Do, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 139. See Sprague, supra note 14, at 1010. 
 140. Id. at 993. 
 141. Id. at 962–63. 
 142. January NLRB Memo, supra note 132, at 2; May NLRB Memo, supra note 132, at 2. 
 143. Sprague, supra note 14, at 998 (citations omitted). 
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1.  Terms and Conditions 
Section 7 protects employees’ discussion of the terms and conditions 
of their employment.144 The employee’s discussion must be centered on 
the actual terms and conditions of employment and not merely consist 
of communications via Facebook about what happens at work.145 Issues 
“related to wages, including the tax treatment of earnings, are directly 
related to the employment relationship.”146 Therefore, an employee 
posting complaints on Facebook about an employer who improperly 
withheld payroll tax will be protected for participating in a concerted 
activity.147 Furthermore, an employee who “like[s]” the Facebook 
comment will also be protected. The “like” is considered “sufficiently 
meaningful as to rise to the level of concerted activity.”148  
2.  Evidence of Concert 
The NLRB considers an employee’s actions a concerted activity if 
the actions foster a discussion among other employees or take collective 
employee issues to management.149 The inherently social nature of 
social media on the one hand tends to make this element easier to prove; 
on the other hand, social media fosters an environment ripe for personal 
gripes.150 To comply with the NLRB’s definition of concerted activity, 
an activity must be directed towards management; comments directed 
towards a political figure will not be protected.151 Discussion between 
employees about their supervisors over Facebook can be protected as 
evidence of a concerted activity. To trigger this protection the 
participants in the discussion must “share[] a common concern about 
the effects of the supervisor’s conduct upon their terms and conditions 
                                                                                                                     
 144. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 145. An employee who referred to a homeless facility as “spooky” and a “mental 
institution” did not engage in “discourse” on the terms and conditions of employment. The 
employee “merely communicat[ed] with her personal friends about what was happening on her 
shift.” Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan B. 
Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir. of Region 34, Martin House, No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 3223853, at 
*1–2 (July 19, 2011). 
 146. Three D, LLC, No. 43-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862, at *7 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges 
Jan. 3, 2012). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. The “like” was an “assent to the comments being made, and a meaningful 
contribution to the discussion.” Id. 
 149. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rik Lineback, 
Reg’l Dir. of Region 25, Rural Metro, No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 2960970, at *2 (June 29, 
2011) [hereinafter Rural Metro Memo]. 
 150. Lauren K. Neal, Note, The Virtual Water Cooler and the NLRB: Concerted Activity in 
the Age of Facebook, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1751 (2012). 
 151. Rural Metro Memo, supra note 149, at *2. 
19
Carlson: Social Media and the Workplace: How I Learned to Stop Worrying an
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
498 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
of employment.”152 Essentially, employees speaking about their 
employer must be addressing fellow employees about a common issue 
that affects the circumstances of their employment situation. For 
example, in response to not being promoted, an employee sent a series 
of emails and Facebook posts suggesting that his supervisor was having 
an affair with an employee who received the promotion.153 Despite the 
fact that other employees participated in these conversations via 
Facebook, the General Counsel determined that the other employees 
were only participating “to express amusement or sympathy” and not 
because they wanted to participate in a discussion about terms of 
employment or their supervisor’s conduct.154 After being transferred to 
a position that paid less, “[u]sing expletives, [an employee] stated the 
Employer had messed up and that she was done with being a good 
employee.”155 The General Counsel found that the employee was 
participating in a concerted activity because her comments elicited a 
number of posts from other employees that echoed their own 
“frustrations with the [e]mployer’s treatment of employees.” 156  
Generally, personal grievances will not be protected if they are not 
intended to induce a group action. If the employee’s Facebook 
complaint about a supervisor is merely a personal gripe and the ensuing 
conversation with a coworker is not an attempt to change anything or 
induce any group action, it will not be protected even if the conversation 
focuses on ways to cope with the supervisor.157 Complaining about a 
personal grievance with a customer or coworker is not a concerted 
activity if it does not attempt to induce action on the part of other 
employees.158 
Employees’ social media discussions about supervisors or terms and 
conditions of employment do not have to be in an advanced stage.159 
Several coworkers responded to a Facebook post from an employee 
frustrated with the promotion of a new manager by agreeing with the 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Sprague, supra note 14, at 974 (citations omitted). 
 153. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Cornele A. 
Overstreet, Reg’l Dir. of Region 28, Sagepoint Fin., Inc., No. 28-CA-23441, 2011 WL 3793672, 
at *1 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
 154. Id. at *2. 
 155. January NLRB Memo, supra note 132, at 3. 
 156. Id. at 5. 
 157. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda Pate 
Jones, Reg’l Dir. of Region 27, Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Ctr., No. 27-CA-
065577, 2011 WL 6543306, at *3 (Dec. 6, 2011). 
 158. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda Pate 
Jones, Reg’l Dir. of Region 27, Pub. Serv. Credit Union, No. 27-CA-21923, 2011 WL 5822506, 
at *3–4 (Nov. 1, 2011) (finding that a gripe about a customer was not attempting to engage other 
employees in any action); January NLRB Memo, supra note 132, at 12–13 (finding an employee 
who expressed only personal anger with her coworkers had not engaged in a concerted activity). 
 159. January NLRB Memo, supra note 132, at 21–22. 
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employee and complaining of mismanagement.160 Two of the 
employees were fired and the other two were disciplined for the 
Facebook conversation.161 The General Counsel determined that the 
coworkers were sharing concerns about the terms and conditions of 
their employment and, despite the fact that these concerns were in their 
preliminary stages, the termination did not allow the employees time to 
organize actual concretive activity.162 Recently, the NLRB issued a 
decision about five coworkers who were terminated for expressing 
concern over criticism received by another worker via Facebook.163 The 
ALJ found that the Facebook comments were protected by the NLRA 
because the coworkers “were taking a first step towards taking group 
action to defend themselves” against criticism from another 
coworker.164 The NLRB adopted the ALJ decision and added that the 
five employees’ comments “made common cause” and “together their 
actions were concerted” in preparing a “group defense” to the 
complaints.165  
These examples make it clear that merely discussing a matter 
involving the workplace with other employees via a social media 
website is not enough to be considered concerted activity. To be 
afforded protections, employees must be discussing conduct that 
impacts the terms and conditions of their employment. If employees are 
trying to take action about their employment situation, they must take 
their grievances to the employer. Furthermore, a social media 
conversation must involve more than an employee’s personal issue and 
it must attempt to solicit action on the part of other employees. 
3.  Criticism of Coworkers 
Section 7 of the NLRA protects an employee’s criticism of a 
coworker’s job performance,166 but there are limitations to those 
protections. For instance, if the criticism is not seeking to involve other 
employees in resolving work-related issues, it will not be protected.167 
                                                                                                                     
 160. Id. at 20–21. 
 161. Id. at 21. 
 162. Id. 21–22. 
 163. An employee posted, “a coworker feels that we don’t help our clients enough . . . . I 
about had it! My fellow coworkers how do u feel?” to her Facebook wall, triggering a lengthy 
discussion between her coworkers that violated the employer’s policy. Hispanics United of 
Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012), 2012 WL 
6800769, at *2. 
 166. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 2011 WL 3894520 (“Explicit or implicit criticism 
by a coworker of the manner in which they are performing their jobs is a subject about which 
employee discussion is protected by Section 7.”). 
 167. A reporter’s criticism via Twitter of coworkers and reference to “TV people” as 
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Further, the criticism will not be protected if it is mere griping and does 
not suggest that an “[e]mployer should do [something] about it.”168 The 
NLRB will also not protect criticisms of employers or coworkers who 
do not attempt to take their issues to management, particularly if the 
criticisms are visible to the employer’s customers.169 The General 
Counsel rationalized that communication of dissatisfaction with a 
coworker’s behavior with customers is conduct that would have an 
impact on an employer’s business.170 From this case it is clear that the 
NLRB is concerned about protecting employees’ § 7 rights, but at the 
same time, the NLRB is not willing to force employers to allow such 
conduct that could potentially alienate their customer base. Through 
these cases employees can distill that they have some leeway in public 
coworker criticism; however, there is only a very narrow margin of 
conduct that will be protected. An employee seeking to correct a 
coworker’s behavior will likely find protection, whereas mere 
complaints without an attempt at action is unlikely to be afforded 
protection. 
4.  “Opprobrious Conduct” and Other Unprotected Behavior 
There are several categories of speech and behavior that are not 
protected by § 7. Among these categories are threats,171 racial 
stereotypes or racial slurs,172 and vulgar jokes.173 These types of 
                                                                                                                     
“stupid” for making mistakes does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment nor 
does it seek to involve other employees in addressing work-related issues. Advice Memorandum 
from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Cornele A. Overstreet, Reg’l Dir. of Region 28, 
Lee Enters., Inc., d/b/a/ Ariz. Daily Star, No. 28-CA-23267, 2011 WL 1825089, at *3, 5 (Apr. 
21, 2011). As such, this employee’s conduct was not considered a concerted activity. Id. at *4–
5. 
 168. A complaint on Facebook about a coworker’s irritating mannerisms while traveling 
was not a concerted activity because it did not concern the terms and conditions of employment 
“and [it] was not even suggesting that the Employer should do anything about it.” Advice 
Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wayne Gold, Reg’l Dir. of Region 
5, Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., No. 05-CA-36658, 2011 WL 6009620, at *2 (Nov. 14, 2011). 
 169. A bartender who criticized her coworker’s bartending practices via Facebook did not 
participate in a concerted activity because the employee did not take the issue to management 
and instead chose to post it where it was readily viewable by the bar’s patrons. Advice 
Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Richard L. Ahearn, Reg’l Dir. of 
Region 19, The Wedge Corp. d/b/a/ The Rock Wood Fired Pizza & Spirits, No. 19-CA-32981, 
2011 WL 4526829, at *3 (Sept. 19, 2011). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Richard L. 
Ahearn, Reg’l Dir. of Region 19, Frito Lay, Inc., No. 36-CA-10882, 2011 WL 4526828, at *1 
(Sept. 19, 2011) (refusing to extend protection to an employee whose Facebook post threatened 
that he was “a hair away from setting it off in that BITCH”). 
 172. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ray Kassab, 
Acting Reg’l Dir. of Region 7, Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 07-CA-06682, 2012 WL 1795803, at *3 
(Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Detroit Med. Ctr. Memo]. 
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comments lose any protection they would have under evidence of 
concerted activity or terms and conditions of employment because the 
terms cause disruption and racial tension in the workplace.174 The 
NLRB will not extend any protection to an employee who is aware that 
their Facebook post is false and potentially damaging to the 
employer.175 However, critical comments about an employer do not lose 
protection simply because they can be seen by nonemployees, so long 
as the comments were not critical of the employer’s product or business 
policies.176 For example, several employees participated in a 
conversation on Facebook that was initiated by an employee posting 
that she hated her place of employment and that her operations manager 
was responsible for her feeling that way.177 An employee of a hospital 
made multiple accusations that the hospital’s “corporate paradigm” was 
responsible for a prior employee’s fatal shooting.178 Despite the fact that 
the comments were disparaging to the employer, the comments did not 
lose their protection because they did not disparage the employer’s 
product.179 In summation, the NLRB refuses to recognize certain types 
of behavior because of its offensive or indefensible nature. However, 
the mere fact that nonemployees can view an employee’s criticism of an 
employer will not bar the employee from protection, so long as it is not 
critical of the employer’s business or product. 
B.  NLRB Regulation of Social Media Policies 
Recently the General Counsel of the NLRB updated its policies on 
employers’ social media policies by releasing a memorandum exploring 
several cases and explaining which examples are and are not 
appropriate.180 If the NLRB finds that an employer’s policies are not 
compliant with the NLRA, those policies will not be enforced.181 The 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Elbert F. Tellem, 
Acting Reg’l Dir. of Region 2, Schulte, Roth, & Zabel, No. 02-CA-60476, 2011 WL 5122642, 
at *1 (Oct. 13, 2011) (refusing to extend protection to an employee who used profanity in his 
job title on his LinkedIn profile because it was in poor taste despite the fact that the employee 
claimed it was a joke). 
 174. See Detroit Med. Ctr. Memo, supra note 172, at *3. 
 175. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ronald K. 
Hooks, Reg’l Dir. of Region 26, TAW, Inc., No. 26-CA-63082, 2011 WL 6543304, at *2 (Nov. 
22, 2011). 
 176. See January NLRB Memo, supra note 132, at 25. 
 177. Id. at 24–25. 
 178. Id. at 26. Over the course of five months the employee posted four letters to the 
website of a local newspaper. Id. 
 179. Id. at 29. The General Counsel determined that the employee’s letters did not 
disparage the healthcare that the hospital provided to its patients. Id. at 29–30. 
 180. See generally May NLRB Memo, supra note 132. 
 181. See, e.g., Mercury Marine-Division of Brunswick Corp., 282 N.L.R.B. 794, 794–95 
(1987) (holding that the rules requiring that employees seek their employers’ permission to 
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purpose of an employer’s social media policy is to educate employees 
on acceptable uses of social media in order to maintain compliance with 
state or federal laws.182 These policies protect both the employer and the 
employee from potential liability.  
Employers are not free to impose whatever social media policies 
they wish upon their employees. Social media policies must meet the 
rigorous and often-changing standards set forth by the NLRB. 
Employers violate § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by imposing a rule that 
“would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their 
Section 7 rights.”183 There is a three-part inquiry to determine if an 
employer’s rule would have such an effect.184  
First, a rule is clearly unlawful if it explicitly restricts 
Section 7 protected activities. If the rule does not explicitly 
restrict protected activities, it will only violate Section 
8(a)(1) upon a showing that: (1) employees would 
reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 
activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union 
activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the 
exercise of Section 7 rights.185 
While an employee cannot suffer an adverse employment action for 
violating an employer’s social media policy that violated the NLRA, an 
employee who violates an employer’s lawful social media policy may 
be terminated for willful misconduct.186 Some practitioners criticize the 
rules promulgated by the NLRB Memo by saying they take away 
employers’ abilities to combat social media issues in the workplace.187 
                                                                                                                     
engage in § 7 activity violates the NLRA); KSL Claremont Resort, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836 
(2005) (holding that an employer’s rules cannot proscribe “negative conversations” about 
managers because of the potential chilling effect on protected NLRB activities). 
 182. For an extensive list of employers’ social media policies, see Policy Database, SOC. 
MEDIA GOVERNANCE, http://socialmediagovernance.com/policies.php (last visited Mar. 3, 
2014). 
 183. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 184. Martin Luther Memorial Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004). 
 185. See May NLRB Memo, supra note 132, at 3. 
 186. See Chapman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 20 A.3d 603, 605, 610 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2011) (affirming an employee’s termination for willful misconduct for violating 
the employer’s social media policy by posting on Facebook while on duty); Snyder v. 
Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *16, *20, *29 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
3, 2008) (finding that a student–teacher was properly dismissed for violating her school’s 
Internet policy by posting personal information about a supervising teacher). 
 187. See, e.g., Daniel Schwartz, After NLRB’s Memo, Drafting Employment Policies Got 
Trickier, CONN. EMP’T L.BLOG (May 31, 2012), http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2012/ 
05/articles/after-nlrbs-memo-drafting-employment-policies-got-trickier (arguing that the 
NLRB’s memo on employment policies is an “utter mess” that is a “crazy assault on an 
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However, the measures that the NLRB is willing to take with its rules 
protecting employee speech via social media strengthens the argument 
that employees have ample legal protection and any further legislation 
would be redundant. Employees can voice their concerns and attempt to 
coordinate action against an employer or coworker and still be protected 
from adverse employment action. 
III.  ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS ARE UNNECESSARY WHEN 
EMPLOYEES ARE CONSCIENTIOUS ABOUT ENABLING PRIVACY SETTINGS 
The additional solutions proposed to protect employees from adverse 
employment actions are both impractical and unnecessary considering 
the available protection when privacy settings are enabled. The 
application of a lifestyle discrimination statute or the broadening of the 
Fourth Amendment to accommodate social media use is duplicative and 
presents issues when applied to social media. 
A.  Amending or Adopting Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes Is an 
Impractical Solution 
Lifestyle discriminations statutes are laws that protect an employee’s 
off-duty conduct.188 Some legal practitioners acknowledge that the 
statutes’ applicability to social media is unclear but still suggest that 
they may extend protection to employees.189 Arguments have also been 
made that existing law does not adequately protect an employee’s off-
duty social media activities, and that it is necessary to enact or amend 
state lifestyle discrimination statutes in order to protect these 
activities.190 There are several reasons why lifestyle discrimination 
                                                                                                                     
employer’s ability to have policies that have any teeth to them”). 
 188. Christine Burke & Barbara Roth, Labor: Lifestyle Discrimination Laws Are Becoming 
Increasingly Prevalent, INSIDECOUNSEL (June 13, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/ 
2011/06/13/labor-lifestyle-discrimination-laws-are-becoming-i. 
 189. See, e.g., ROBERT B. FITZPATRICK, SOCIAL MEDIA AND PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE 11 
(2011), available at http://www.robertbfitzpatrick.com/papers/Social-Media-Privacy.pdf; Brian 
Flock, Off-Duty Conduct Statutes Limit Prying into an Applicant’s Online Background, COUNS. 
@ L. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.wac6.com/wac6/2010/08/off-duty-conduct-statutes-limit-
prying-into-an-applicants-online-background.html; Kaiser Wahab & Lauren Mack, Top 
Employer Questions on Employee Social Media Conduct Answered, JDSUPRA L. NEWS (Mar. 
21, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/top-employer-questions-on-employee-socia-
22807. 
 190. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?: Limiting 
the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 625, 680–83 (2004); Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling the World Wide Weblog: A 
Proposal for Blogging, Employment-at-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 245, 247 (2007); Joseph Lipps, Note, State Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: 
Autonomy for Private Employees in the Internet Age, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 646 (2011); Jean M. 
Roche, Note, Why Can’t We Be Friends?: Why California Needs a Lifestyle Discrimination 
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statutes should not be relied upon for protection. First, despite the 
seemingly wide-open language of a few state lifestyle discrimination 
statutes, state courts have limited the protection that these statues 
provide employees. Second, many of these statutes were written to 
protect specific conduct such as tobacco use, sexual orientation, or 
political affiliation.191 These statutes were not written to protect 
employees’ social media conduct.192 Finally, as argued throughout this 
Note, there are ample alternative channels available that provide 
employees with protection so long as employees are diligent in the 
protection of their privacy rights by engaging social media privacy 
settings. 
The protection provided by the lifestyle discrimination statutes with 
the broadest language is actually extremely limited. Five states have 
adopted broad language in their lifestyle discrimination statutes aimed 
at protecting employees’ lawful off-duty conduct.193 An overview of 
how state courts have interpreted these statutes shows the limited 
protection these statutes actually offer to employees. For example, the 
plain language of California’s statute implies that it would, without 
exception, provide protection to employees’ lawful off-duty conduct.194 
In reality the protection is incredibly narrow. In 2000, the California 
Attorney General limited the protection of that statute to cover only 
“independently recognized constitutional rights.”195 Thus, much of the 
conduct that proponents of lifestyle discrimination statutes want to 
shield will not find any protection under the California law.  
In comparison, Connecticut’s statute focuses only on the speech 
aspect of an employee’s conduct.196 The Free Speech Act was enacted 
to “remedy the disparity” between public sector employees’ First 
Amendment free speech protection and private sector employees who 
are not given First Amendment protection.197 The Act prohibits 
                                                                                                                     
Statute to Protect Employees from Employment Actions Based on Their Off-Duty Behavior, 7 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 187, 202 (2011). 
 191. Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 418–20 (2003), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/ 
facpubs/534. 
 192. Byers, supra note 190, at 275 (“Lifestyle discrimination statutes, which protect lawful 
off-duty activities, conduct, or speech are inadequate to protect at-will employee bloggers 
because the statutes lack protection for both the act of blogging and the speech that necessarily 
accompanies blogging.”). Despite the fact that Byers’s Note centers on blogging, the argument 
is still valid for other types of social media including Facebook. 
 193. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-
402.5(1) (West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-02.4-01 (West 2011); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2012). 
 194. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k); Byers, supra note 190, at 269. 
 195. Supersession of Labor Code § 96, 83 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 226 (2000). 
 196. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q. 
 197. Byers, supra note 190, at 271. 
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employers from “subject[ing] any employee to discipline or discharge 
on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the 
[F]irst [A]mendment to the United States Constitution” so long as the 
“activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the 
employee’s bona fide job performance or the working relationship 
between the employee and the employer.”198 Employers can easily 
circumvent violating this act by arguing that an employee’s speech rose 
to the level of required interference as to negate the employee’s 
protection from the Act. 
New York’s statute protects four categories of lawful off-duty 
conduct: political activities, use of legal consumable products, 
recreational activities, and union membership.199 New York’s statute 
differs from other states’ lifestyle discrimination statutes since it only 
protects the narrower category of “recreational” activities rather than 
any type of lawful off-duty conduct.200 The issue with the application of 
this statute to social media use is that New York state courts have 
limited the term “recreational” only to “clearly defined categories of 
leisure-time activities.”201 Since the statute lists “sports, games, hobbies, 
exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar 
material,”202 state courts have applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to 
conclude that the statute was not intended to cover activities outside of 
that scope.203 
North Dakota also has a fairly broad lifestyle discrimination statute 
to protect lawful off-duty conduct and activities.204 The statute makes an 
exception for activities that are in direct conflict with an employer’s 
business interest.205 This statute provides more protection than states 
that only require that the activity create a conflict of interest with the 
employer.206 The limits of an employer’s business interest have not yet 
been tested in the realm of employee social media so it remains to be 
seen how much protection this statute will afford. 
                                                                                                                     
 198. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q. 
 199. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2012). 
 200. Byers, supra note 190, at 273. 
 201. State v. Wal-Mart Stores, 207 A.D.2d 150, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 202. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(1)(b). 
 203. See, e.g., McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that dating is not a recreational activity under the statute); Wal-Mart, 
207 A.D.2d at 152 (finding that personal relationships fall outside of the scope of the statute’s 
intended coverage); Bilquin v. Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 286 A.D.2d 
409, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding that a woman’s cohabitation with a married man was 
not a recreational activity under the statute); cf. Cavanaugh v. Doherty, 243 A.D.2d 92, 95–96, 
100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that a discussion with a political official in a restaurant 
during an employee’s off-duty hours was a recreational activity). 
 204. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-01 (West 2011). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Byers, supra note 190, at 273–74. 
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Colorado’s statute may come the closest to potential social media 
protection. The language of the statute appears to protect both employee 
privacy and an employer’s business interest.207 The statute limits the 
protection to employees’ activities occurring “off the premises of the 
employer during nonworking hours.”208 The protection is further limited 
as it allows for an exception that would let an employer terminate an 
employee for lawful off-duty conduct that created a conflict of interest 
or interfered with an occupational requirement.209 As these statutes have 
not yet been invoked in a social media case, Colorado courts have not 
had the opportunity to show how broadly or narrowly they will construe 
conflicts of interest. This uncertainty in interpretation should leave 
employees wary of the protections this statute will provide them. 
Many states have even narrower lifestyle discrimination laws that 
only protect specific employee conduct.210 The Right to Privacy in the 
Workplace Act, for example, protects employees from suffering adverse 
employment actions based on their use of lawful products, such as 
tobacco, off of the employer’s premises.211 Five other states have 
similar laws protecting an employee’s use of “lawful products” or 
“lawful consumable products.”212 Roughly ten jurisdictions protect 
employees from adverse employment action based on their sexual 
orientation.213 Finally, a majority of states protect employees’ rights to 
political affiliation.214 
Given the fact that none of these current statutes apply to social 
media, and many states do not have lifestyle discrimination statutes, it is 
implausible to insist that current statutes be broadened or completely 
rewritten215 since employees are already afforded ample protection. 
State courts have already interpreted the broad language of lifestyle 
discrimination statutes to apply to very narrow situations. It is illogical 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Roche, supra note 190, at 200–01. 
 208. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2007). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Sugarman, supra note 191, at 418. 
 211. In Illinois it is “unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise disadvantage any individual, with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment because the individual uses lawful products off the 
premises of the employer during nonworking hours.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (West 
2010). 
 212. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2011); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.333 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-28.2 (West 2012); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2011). 
 213. Sugarman, supra note 191, at 419. For an example of these statutes, see MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 3(6) (West 2012). 
 214. Sugarman, supra note 191, at 419 & n.141. 
 215. See Lipps, supra note 190, at 675–77 (suggesting a model state lifestyle 
discrimination statute for protecting social media use for the purpose of increasing consistency 
and balancing employer and employee rights).  
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to argue that these types of statutes would make a good fit for employee 
social media protection, particularly when current laws that provide 
employees adequate protection are considered.216 
B.  Broadening the Scope of the Fourth Amendment for Public 
Employees Is Unwarranted 
The current state of the law217 makes it unlikely that the Fourth 
Amendment would protect social media use because of the application 
of the Third Party Doctrine.218 The Third Party Doctrine was established 
in the Supreme Court decision United States v. White.219 In 1979 the 
Supreme Court extended the doctrine to include information shared with 
automated machines.220 Thus, individuals lose their Fourth Amendment 
protections by posting information on the Internet where third-party 
Internet service providers host and store the information.221 Once an 
individual passes on personal information to another person, that 
individual no longer has direct control over the confidentiality of that 
information.222  
There has been a recent argument to alter the Third Party Doctrine 
because social media has changed society’s expectation of privacy and 
thus the Third Party Doctrine is not an effective limit to privacy 
expectations.223 Another scholar argues that “[c]ourts should view 
Facebook as the twenty-first century equivalent of a phone booth,” 
implying that instead of the Third Party Doctrine, the Katz224 standard 
for privacy should apply to social media.225 In Katz, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See discussion supra Part I. 
 217. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (establishing that public and 
private sector employees have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy subject to the 
reasonableness of their expectation of privacy). The Court introduced a two-part analysis for 
deciding if there is a right to privacy in the workplace. The employee must have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area the employer searched. Id. If the reasonable expectation 
exists, then the court must decide if the employer’s intrusion on that privacy was justified. Id. at 
718. 
 218. Alexander Naito, Note, A Fourth Amendment Status Update: Applying Constitutional 
Privacy Protection to Employees’ Social Media Use, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 849, 867–68 (2012). 
 219. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (holding that an individual does not 
have an expectation of privacy in materials they choose to share with others). 
 220. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (extending the “Third Party Doctrine” to 
telephone information shared with automated pen registers). 
 221. See Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine 
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (when a person willingly discloses personal 
information on social media, that person’s Fourth Amendment privacy is “vitiated”). 
 222. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 4, at 133.  
 223. Naito, supra note 218, at 875; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 224. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 225. Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social 
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established that in matters of privacy “there is a twofold requirement, 
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”226 However, courts have repeatedly held 
that when an individual knows information can become publically 
available there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.227 In a social 
media context this would include tweets made to followers or comments 
posted on Facebook pages.  
In a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice Sonia Sotomayor urged 
that in the future “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”228 A restructuring of this doctrine 
may occur in the future to address other privacy implications. However, 
there is no current need to restructure the Third Party Doctrine based on 
its relation to social media in an employment context. First, the SCA 
already “is narrowly tailored to provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like 
protections for computer networks.”229 Thus it would be superfluous to 
alter the scope of the Third Party Doctrine. Second, the functions that 
the Third Party Doctrine serve230 outweigh the Internet privacy interests 
scholars seek to protect through this channel. Finally, the Fourth 
Amendment only represents the minimum protection afforded to 
material shared on social media websites.231 Given the fact that more 
comprehensive protections are available to individuals through alternate 
channels,232 such as the NLRA or SCA, these avenues should be 
exhausted before scholars attempt to alter the privacy rights of the 
Fourth Amendment.  
                                                                                                                     
Networking Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 
291, 369 (2011). 
 226. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 227. See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc. 3d 426, 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (reasoning 
that a plaintiff who created a Facebook or MySpace account consented to the fact that her 
personal information would be shared on the Internet regardless of her privacy settings); 
Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (finding that 
“material posted on a ‘private’ Facebook page, that is accessible to a selected group of recipients 
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CONCLUSION 
In summation, an employee who uses social media websites can take 
proactive steps to avoid issues in the workplace by practicing good 
judgment and common sense. Most importantly, employees need to 
activate privacy settings on their social media websites. An overview of 
employment litigation in this area shows that if employees take steps to 
protect their online privacy, employers will have little recourse if they 
are displeased with an employee’s social media presence. If an 
employer wrongfully terminates an employee for something found on a 
Facebook wall or similar social media platform, that employee can seek 
redress through the courts using the appropriate methods explored 
throughout this Note. 
As technology evolves, so must the laws that govern its use—unless 
the laws in place already provide ample protection. When employees 
suffer adverse employment actions based on their social media use that 
are unlawful, there are copious channels available for employees to 
contest those actions. Both public and private sector employees enjoy 
protection from federal discrimination laws, which protect against 
discriminatory adverse employment action, and the SCA, which 
protects against employers’ intrusions into employees’ private social 
media. Employees may also potentially find protection for their online 
privacy from existing causes of action such as intrusion upon seclusion 
or federal legislation such as SNOPA. The First Amendment protects 
public-sector employees, and private-sector employees can find 
additional protection through the NLRB. With this abundance of 
available protections, it is unnecessary to enact new legislation or 
stretch other laws to protect an employee’s social media use. 
Broadening the Fourth Amendment or adopting lifestyle discrimination 
statutes would expand these laws to cover areas for which they were not 
intended and do not logically fit. 
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